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TRIAL TACTICS

Proper and Improper
Use of Other Act Evidence
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

R

ules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
and its state counterparts permit prosecutors
to offer evidence that a criminal defendant
engaged in uncharged misconduct to prove a number
of things that may be relevant in a particular prosecution. If the government must prove knowledge
and/or intent, other act evidence is often a persuasive way to do it. And, although the government is
rarely required to prove motive as an element of
a crime (with hate crimes being a principal exception), other act evidence that proves motive offers
a powerful and persuasive explanation as to why a
defendant committed a charged crime.
The most basic proposition governing rules such
as Rule 404(b) is that the evidence must be offered
for a permissible purpose, not to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime(s) charged.
These rules—unlike Rules 413 and 414—strictly prohibit the use of propensity evidence. Thus, when
the prosecutor offers Rule 404(b) evidence and the
defendant objects, the trial judge typically requires
the prosecutor to identify the permissible purpose(s)
for which the evidence is offered, rules on whether
the evidence is relevant to prove the permissible
purpose(s), and considers whether, even if relevant,
evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial
pursuant to rules such as Rule 403.
If the prosecutor surmounts the defendant’s
objections, the evidence will be admitted and the
prosecutor is free to argue to the jury that the evidence does in fact prove what the prosecutor has
offered it to prove. What the prosecutor may not
do, however, is make an argument that amounts to
a propensity argument, i.e., asking the jury to convict the defendant because he or she is the kind of
person who commits the charged crime(s). But in the
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG is the Wallace

and Beverley Woodbury University Professor
at George Washington University School of
Law in Washington, D.C. He is a past chair
of the Criminal Justice Section and a regular
columnist for Criminal Justice magazine.
He is also author of the book, Trial Tactics,
Third Edition (American Bar Association 2013), an updated
and expanded compilation of his columns.

heat of closing argument, prosecutors can slip and
move from proper argument regarding the permissible purpose(s) for which the evidence was admitted
into a propensity argument. Such a slip can put a
conviction in jeopardy.

A Sample Case: The Facts

United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.
2013), illustrates how a prosecutor succeeded in
having other act evidence admitted, obtained a conviction, and lost it on appeal when the appellate
court determined that the prosecutor erred in making a propensity argument. Theodore Richards was
convicted in district court of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine. The court of appeals reversed
his conviction because of the closing argument.
A joint federal and state police contingent was
engaged in surveillance at a house in Bolingbrook,
Illinois, where an undercover police officer was to
purchase a large amount of cocaine from a highlevel drug dealer. Before the scheduled purchase,
the undercover officer met with the dealer at his
ranch in another city in Illinois. On the day of the
purchase, the officer backed his car into the garage
of the Bolingbrook house, where the dealer’s men
loaded 10 kilograms of cocaine into a compartment
in the car that they could access through the trunk.
The undercover officer then left, but other police
continued surveillance of the house, as the undercover officer suspected additional drugs remained.
Twenty minutes later, a pickup truck arrived at
the house and the driver got out, went inside the
house, and shortly returned to the truck. A surveillance officer followed the truck and saw it meet
a grey Lexus in a mall parking lot. Although the
drivers did not appear to communicate, the Lexus
followed the truck back to the Bolingbrook house,
where the Lexus backed into the garage and the
garage door closed. Ten minutes later, the garage
door opened and the Lexus drove away. A surveillance officer tailed the Lexus, and upon learning
that it was, indeed, cocaine that had been loaded
into the undercover officer’s trunk, the surveillance
officer stopped the Lexus, in which Richards was
driving with a woman passenger.
Although Richards had violated no traffic laws,
the officer obtained a driver’s license and vehicle registration in the course of questioning Richards and
the passenger. Richards told the officer that he had
flown in from California, had picked up the woman
to go on a date, and they were on their way to get
some food. The woman confirmed this story and
said they had been playing video games at another
house. Neither Richards nor the woman said anything about having visited the Bolingbrook house.
Police searched the car without consent and found
a backpack containing 10 kilograms of cocaine.
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Both Richards and the woman denied ownership of
the bag. The government ultimately charged Richards with possession of the bag with the intent to
distribute the cocaine.

The Defense

Richards testified in his own behalf. His defense was
that he thought the bag contained money rather than
drugs. He testified that he had borrowed $50,000
“from some Latinos that he knew collectively only
as the Pelon brothers” to start a trucking company
with his cousin; the company failed when his cousin
(who was to be the driver) got sick; and the Pelons
asked him to transport several packages for them to
help repay the debt. He further testified that he had
opened each of the packages—against the Pelons’
orders—and found that all contained money. Richards testified that he obtained his instructions from
the Pelons at their ranch, where about 30 people
were “doing work and doing things” and everyone
called each other “Pelon.” He said he believed the
Pelons wanted his trips to remain a secret because
they ran businesses such as strip clubs and prostitution and may have been involved with drugs
and in smuggling people over the border. Richards
swore that he had been told to travel to Chicago to
transport money, which is what he thought he was
transporting when the police stopped and searched
the Lexus he was driving.

Other Act Evidence

On cross-examination, the government asked Richards if he had ever talked on the phone with a man
named Juan Beltran and whether he had talked
with Beltran or another person about the need to
obtain drugs. Richards admitted using marijuana
but denied discussing cocaine with anyone.
The government put on a brief rebuttal case.
DEA Agent Riley had monitored a wiretap on
Beltran’s phone in an unrelated investigation. He
testified that Beltran also went by the name “Pelon,”
identified taped conversations in which Beltran and
Richards discussed drug quantity and quality, and
offered the opinion that the language they used
indicated that they were talking about cocaine—
although neither man specifically mentioned any
drug by name.
Richards objected to the testimony on the ground
that there was no evidence that Beltran was the same
Pelon who had sent Richards to Bolingbrook. But
the government argued that the evidence rebutted
Richards’s claim that he was completely ignorant
of how the drug trade worked and was relevant to
prove the defendant’s knowledge that there were
drugs in the backpack. The trial judge agreed and
admitted some, but not all, of the taped conversations between Richards and Beltran.

Closing Argument

The prosecutor lost little time during closing argument in calling Richards a “cocaine dealer” and a
“drug trafficker.” The defense objected that this was
propensity evidence, but the district judge admonished defense counsel for interrupting closing
argument and instructed the jury not to infer guilt
solely from evidence of past acts. The prosecutor
repeated the “cocaine dealer” and “drug trafficker”
language in the first closing argument. In rebuttal
closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the
taped Richards/Beltran conversations as “California calls” and relied exclusively on those calls to
support its characterization of Richards as a cocaine
dealer and drug trafficker:
• The only thing that is disputed is whether the
defendant knew he had just picked up ten
kilograms of cocaine. And in answering that
question think about what is reasonable and
what makes sense. And there is [sic] two things
in particular that will help you answer that
question. The defendant is a cocaine dealer
and the defendant is a liar.
• But if we have met our burden on the instruction that will be given, then the California
calls are absolutely relevant to knowledge and
intent on November 21st. And the Judge will
instruct you as much. To think that that is not
relevant is absurd. He is a cocaine dealer.
• The problem is you have heard what the defendant sounds like when he doesn’t think anyone
is listening, when he doesn’t think anyone is
watching. You heard the calls. You reviewed
the transcripts. When he doesn’t think anyone
is listening, he is a cocaine dealer. When he
thinks people are watching and listening, he is
back to poor me, I was just delivering money
to pay back the loan. That is absurd.
• And we are not saying the ten kilos of cocaine
were connected to the intercepted call from
California. We are not arguing that. We are
not saying that. Clearly the defendant’s drug
dealing is not limited to California. It happens here too.
• These layers of concealment are used to give
drug dealers plausible deniability. But that
doesn’t work for the defendant because we
already know he is a cocaine dealer.
(Id. at 753–54.)

On Appeal: Admissibility of the Tapes

The court of appeals held that the district judge
did not abuse discretion in admitting the taped conversations. It found that the government offered
the evidence to prove knowledge—a permissible
non-propensity purpose—and that Richards had
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placed knowledge in issue when he testified that he
thought the backpack contained money and not
drugs The court acknowledged that in prior cases
such as United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.
2012), it had held that prior bad act evidence is inadmissible when the defendant asserts innocence in a
more general way or argues that his or her conduct
fails to satisfy some element of the crime other than
knowledge and intent. Miller had contended that
the drugs belonged to his girlfriend and did not dispute intent or knowledge, and the court of appeals
concluded that the use of prior convictions for drug
offenses amounted to propensity use, whereas Richards directly and specifically disputed knowledge.
The court of appeals also found Beltran’s alias of
“Pelon” connected him to the ranch where Richards
got his instructions. This warranted an inference that
when Richards discussed drugs with Beltran, Richards knew of drug trafficking originating from the
ranch. The court agreed with Richards that if the
California calls had captured some generic conversation about drugs that was completely unconnected
to the drug operation that caused Richards to travel
to Bolingbrook, they would amount to propensity
evidence if offered to prove knowledge.
Finally, the court found that the taped calls were
similar enough and close enough in time to be
relevant and that the district judge did not abuse discretion in rejecting a Rule 403 argument to exclude
them. The court reiterated that the judge took the
proper prophylactic steps to assure that no improper
inference from the calls was drawn by the jury.
One judge concurred in the result. She disagreed
that the judge properly admitted the California calls
to prove knowledge and argued that nothing in those
calls gave Richards the slightest reason to think that
he would be carrying drugs rather than money when
he left the Bolingbrook house. She observed that
“pelon” is a Spanish word that means “Bald Guy”
or “Baldy” and declined to infer anything more from
the fact that a number of people called themselves
“Pelon” than she would infer if they called themselves “Shorty,” “Red-head,” or “Curly.” Thus, she

argued that there was no evidence to tie Beltran to
the people at the ranch.

The Propensity Argument

Although it found no error in the admission of the
taped calls, the court of appeals unanimously concluded that in its closing arguments the prosecution
invited the jury to draw a propensity inference from
the calls. The court clearly stated that after the judge
admits other act evidence for a permissible purpose,
the prosecution cannot later argue that the evidence
shows the defendant’s propensity to deal drugs.
The court identified the “drug dealer” and “drug
trafficker” language as an example of an improper
propensity argument. It added that this was not
the most glaring example and identified as even
more glaring an argument by the prosecution that
the defendant dealt drugs in California and must
have done so in Illinois, too. The court concluded
that the prosecution placed the forbidden propensity inference at the center of its closing arguments
and prejudiced Richards, because his credibility was
crucial and the government’s propensity argument
worked to attack that credibility.

Lessons

1. Other act evidence may not be admitted to
prove propensity under Rule 404(b) and
similar rules. It may only be admitted for a
permissible purpose.
2. Evidence that a defendant may have been dealing drugs on some occasion may amount to
propensity evidence when offered to prove
something such as knowledge when the other
drug evidence is completely unrelated to the
crime charged.
3. Once Rule 404(b)-type evidence is admitted for
a proper purpose, the prosecution must take
care in closing argument not to slip and make
a propensity-based argument.
4. Where the defendant’s credibility is critical,
propensity-based arguments may be especially
prejudicial. n
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